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the consequences of nAto and Eu enlargement have discouraged Eurasian political elites from using the EEu as a stepping-stone to the neo-liberal world economic system. their economic and geopolitical 
interests have been infringed by Western policies as illustrated by the conflict in ukraine. the EEu has 
reacted by turning inward and eastward and an alternative geo-political bloc is in formation. It is likely to 
form a nationally based administratively coordinated form of capitalism, which in turn might lead to greater 
international conflict. the West should practise democracy between states to secure international stability 
rather than promoting democracy within states. A more pluralistic multi-speed Eu, with less ambitious goals 
and taking into account external interests, could become a complimentary partner to the EEu and enhance 
peace and well-being.
“Periods of crisis are common in history. The 
characteristic feature of the [twenty year] crisis … was 
the abrupt descent from the visionary hopes of the 
first decade to the grim despair of the second, from a 
utopia which took little account of reality to a reality 
from which every element of utopia was rigorously 
excluded1”. Here E.H. Carr was referring to the years 
between 1919 and 1939 and wrote these words just 
before Great Britain plunged into war with Germany, 
and consequently the Second World War engulfed the 
whole of Europe. Is history likely to repeat itself? 
Following the dismantling of the Soviet European 
economic and political bloc in the early 1990s, politics 
promised utopian futures for both the winners and 
the losers of the Cold War. In the West, pundits and 
politicians echoed the rhetoric of Fukuyama’s ‘end of 
history’ discourse. In the post-socialist states, leaders 
and publics envisaged a return to Western values, 
a democratic peace and an advance to Western 
consumerism. By the end of the second decade, in the 
West the global financial crisis and the rise of austerity 
regimes, and in the East the widespread disenchantment 
with the political and economic settlement of the 
transition to capitalism, signalled the end of the post- 
communist utopias.
The vision for the decade after 2010 is one of greater 
tension and conflict epitomised by the confrontation 
in Eastern Ukraine. The reality is the advance of NATO 
and the EU to the borders of the Russian Federation, 
which it considers is a security threat. 
The EU, once predicated on the goal of promotion of 
peace, has degenerated into a competitive trading 
bloc with an unquenchable appetite for enlargement. 
The cumulative effect of expansion into a supra-
national state has outgrown the original conception 
and has reached imperial dimensions. As European 
Commissioner Jose Manuel Barroso put it in 2007: 
“We are a very special construction unique in 
the history of mankind. Sometimes I like to 
compare the EU as a creation to the organisation 
of empire. We have the dimension of empire. 
What we have is the first non-imperial empire. 
We have 27 countries that fully decided to work 
together and to pool their sovereignty. I believe 
it is a great construction and we should be 
proud of it”.2  
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Here he raises the spectre of the EU as an empire which 
exerts cultural, political, and economic hegemony.
Enlargement is predicated not on preserving the 
stability of the international order, but on the economic 
benefits to the EU of a larger market based on the 
values of the Washington consensus and a superior 
geopolitical position for NATO. 
tHE EurASIAn EconomIc unIon
Most commentators trace the rise of the EEU to the 
failure of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood politics on 
the one side, and the incapacity of the CIS to create a 
common economic and political space on the other. The 
formation of the EEU is not just the extension of Russian 
foreign policy, but is favoured by the governments of 
Belarus and Kazakhstan; notably, President Nazarbaev 
first proposed the formation of a Eurasian Union in 1994.
Ironically, in its reaction to the development of the 
EU, the EEU has been guided by the EU’s experience 
and likens itself to it. The EEU seeks the advantages 
of economies of scale provided by a larger market. It 
aspires to the EU’s aims of the free movement within its 
territory of labour, capital, goods and services; it respects 
the free trade market principles of the WTO.  It considers 
itself to be an area promoting peace and prosperity. This 
approach has found resonance in the writing of Western 
writers like Bjorn Hettne who have promoted the idea 
of a ‘new regionalism’, and envisage the development 
of economic and political blocs (like the EU) which can 
harmonise with the current hegemonic powers in the 
world economic system.  
Different interpretations are placed on the EEU. Like 
the EU, underlying the formation of the EEU has been a 
wider political and geopolitical agenda which uneasily 
coexists with its free market economic principles. 
The policy of the Russian Federation under Putin 
and Medvedev entailed a major change towards the 
West which challenged some established Western 
assumptions.   In the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept 
Russia’s objectives were to preserve the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the country. It noted critically “a 
growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar 
structure of the world with the economic and political 
domination of the United States”. 
Moreover,  it identified: 
“attempts to create an international relations 
structure based on domination by developed 
Western countries in the international 
community, under US leadership and designed 
for unilateral solutions (including the use of 
military force) to key issues in world politics 
in circumvention of the fundamental rules of 
international law”.3
The longer term intention of some Eurasianists is to 
further a quite different form of political organisation to 
that of the current neo-liberal world political economic 
order. It is a movement which is opposed to Western 
hegemony in a reactive rather than an aggressive sense. 
There is a tension between a more neo-liberal approach 
in line with the current free market EU model and a 
Eurasian notion of state sovereignty, endorsed by the 
leadership of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Western 
policy influences internal political dynamics in support 
of one or the other. These standpoints underpin two 
alternative theoretical political and economic paths: 
first, a region within the hegemonic Western framework 
and second, the rise of a bipolar region.
tHE EEu AS A rEGIon oF tHE 
nEo-LIbErAL WorLD SyStEm
President Putin, basing his argument on common 
membership of the WTO, has contended that both the 
EU and EEU would be able forge a wider pan-European 
association to mutual advantage. As Sergei Lavrov, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, has declared it: “We must 
work for a union of unions, an alliance of the EU and 
the Eurasian Union”.4 This line of thinking would enable 
forms of collaboration from “the Atlantic to the Pacific 
Ocean”.5 The EEU would be built on the laws of the 
market and, most important of all, would be part of a 
Greater Europe. The EEU would become “one of the poles 
of the modern world and be an effective link between 
Europe and the Asian-Pacific region”.6 
These statements highlight one major dimension of 
EEU policy . The implementation of such policies would 
constitute a ‘stepping stone’ for the EEU to become 
a member of the existing international system. One 
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possibility for future relations between the EU and 
EEU would be the acceptance of a multipolar Europe 
involving overlapping areas of autonomy, both within 
the EU (along lines suggested by critics, such as David 
Cameron), and with other regional associations, such as 
the Eurasian Economic Community. Such a multi-stage 
and multi-pace EU would be conducive to internal 
cohesion as well as contributing to peace with the non-
EU post-socialist states. The EEU would complement 
rather than threaten the hegemonic Western powers.
Neo-liberalism is like putty and can be manipulated 
into different forms; the EEU in subscribing to freedom 
of markets for the factors of production would present 
another association of neo-liberal states. It would 
moreover be shielded by its own boundaries, at least 
initially, from more powerful economic forces in the EU. 
However, critics point out that markets have their 
own logic and would drive the EEU into the Western 
dominated neo-liberal world system. Even if regional 
associations start out as economic free trade areas, 
such as the European Free Trade Area, the economic 
dynamics lead to further integration. American foreign 
policy according to Peter Katzenstein “made regionalism 
a central feature of world politics”7; regionalisation 
supports rather than threatens American hegemony. 
The EEU would become “primarily [a zone] of economic 
activity in the world system and in that sense driven 
by markets rather than states”.8  There would be a 
convergence to the norms of the hegemonic powers.
This scenario is perhaps a visionary utopia for the 
coming decade as it would require the reversal of 
many current EU policies. The EU would have to temper 
its expansionist propensities to accommodate other 
regional interests and overlapping associations. The EU’s 
democratic scope would have to shift from democracy 
promotion within states to pursue democracy between 
states (including those in its neighbourhood). This 
means making compromises with other states.
Eu EnLArGEmEnt: LESSonS 
From uKrAInE 
The EU has been uncompromising in its attitude to 
Russia. Consider EU enlargement in relation to Ukraine. 
The DCFTA presented Ukraine with a choice (either the 
EU or the Eurasian course) as it was contended that 
two sets of rules could not operate in the EU economic 
space.9  Agreements with partners include the institution 
of laws compatible with the single market affecting 
state subsidies and insist on freedom of competition. 
The objective is to realise the neo-liberal goals of the 
EU – the free movement of capital, commodities and 
people under conditions of market competition. The 
consequences of the agreements are intended to 
influence the political and economic arrangements of 
the neighbourhood states to make them compatible 
with the economic, political and legal norms of the EU. 
Potential benefits to partners come at considerable 
costs to other countries, particularly to former trading 
countries, in the east. 
The effects of Ukraine’s participation in the EU as 
proposed in the AA (drafted in March 2012) would 
have resulted in major disruptions of Ukraine-Russia 
trade. Regulations affecting production and service 
provision would also be brought in line with EU 
standards. Moreover, Ukrainian-EU agreements would 
have repercussions on relations with the ECU, which 
would nullify Ukraine’s favourable links with Russia. Not 
only would Ukraine, when subjected to the EU market, 
experience more de-industrialisation, it would also have 
significant effects on Russia which has been Ukraine’s 
most important single country trading partner. 
As we see from Figure 1, in 2010 and 2012, Russia’s 
exports to and imports from Ukraine were greater 
than all the EU countries combined and Russia-Ukraine 
trade was rising whereas with the EU it was declining. 
By far the most important trading partners are to be 
found in developing economies and the CIS – not the 
EU. While the long-term prospects are portrayed by 
the EU as favourable, in the short term there would 
be considerable dislocation, as adjustments to EU 
standards and open competition with EU companies 
would certainly lead to the demise of many Ukrainian 
firms. It would also grossly undermine previous partners 
in Russia who would lose business with repercussions 
for employment and well-being. 
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Figure 1. Ukraine’s Trading Partners: 2006-2012
It is true that a country cannot be a member 
concurrently of two free trade areas. There are however 
other possibilities of increasing levels of trade between 
the EU and Ukraine without the disruption of Ukraine-
Russia commerce. The response of Russia has been to 
try to find some middle way to allow Ukraine to have 
economic trade relations with both blocs. Putin in 
November 2010 proposed the formation of associations 
which would promote a ‘greater Europe’ from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok.10 As recently as January 2014, Russia 
suggested to Brussels the establishment of a Free Trade 
Area between the EU and the EEU.11 While in the West 
such suggestions have either been ignored or rejected, 
they have some merit. If adopted, they might lead to 
something like the relationship of the European Free 
Trade Area to the EU. Negotiations between the EU 
and the USA over the TTIP are another example of 
how cooperation is possible between two commercial 
blocs (whether this agreement is desirable or not is a 
separate issue). Such negotiations include bilateral 
and multilateral agreements on tariffs and public 
procurement, cooperation on regulatory rules and 
the enhancement of bilateral trade. Clearly there are 
real possibilities for cooperation between trading blocs.
Russian proposals have been dismissed by the EU and 
NATO. Both organisations have adamantly championed 
conditions which would not preclude membership of 
Ukraine in their respective associations at some future 
time. Consequently the Russian leadership is no longer 
inclined to accept the terms offered by the West, which 
it believes further the EU’s hegemonic power. Policy 
then moves away from a complimentary ‘stepping 
stone’ towards a more autonomous bloc. The absence 
of a negotiated settlement enabling the entry of the 
EEU on acceptable terms into the dominant economic 
core, prompts the rise of an alternative and competing 
geopolitical alliance. 
Source:  IMF Direction of World Trade Data Base, 
accessed via UKDS Stat, 30 July 2014. 
Total value in US millions of dollars.
Ukraine Exports
Ukraine Imports
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EurASIAn unIon AS PArt oF An 
ALtErnAtIvE GEo-PoLItIcAL bLoc
Since the Ukrainian conflict, the Russian leadership 
has paid more attention to linkages with the Asian-
Pacific area and to strengthening ties with groupings 
such as the SCO and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) countries. The West’s trade 
sanctions exercised against Russia and its retaliatory 
responses have had the effect of reinforcing the 
rise of a geopolitical bloc based on the EEU and the 
BRICS, especially China. While there is no challenge to 
American hegemony, these countries claim respect 
and recognition in the world community. Relations 
between the EEU and the EU will be overshadowed 
by the EEU’s growing links to the east. As reported in 
2015 at the SCO summit, the EEU had secured bilateral 
free trade areas with Vietnam, Egypt, India, Israel, South 
Korea and Chile. The SCO also envisages enlargement 
with the addition of India and Pakistan. 
For countries in the semi-core of the world system, 
regionalism need not entail adopting the principles of 
neo-liberal globalisation. China, Russia, India, Brazil and 
Venezuela and constituents of regional groups – SCO, 
the ECU, MERCOSUR, and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) – can strengthen their position 
against hegemonic powers.  
I have used the term semi-core as it better captures 
the economic and political status of countries like 
Russia, China, India, and Brazil. Semi-core countries 
have their own transnational corporations, are hosts 
to foreign corporations and concurrently have their 
own national companies.  The BRICS formed a New 
Development Bank in 2007 which is at least potentially 
an alternative to the World Bank. The growing power 
of their economic base gives such countries political 
influence and military power. While not matching the 
strength of the US, when combined these countries have 
considerable military power. Russia has been pushed 
further into the formation of a non-Western association 
of states. Many of these, though state-led and autocratic, 
provide a fundamental social and political stability in 
the countries concerned. 
Internationally, one can detect a growing alternative 
political consensus. Consider for example the 
condemnation of Russia’s incorporation of Crimea 
within its borders following the seizure of power by 
insurgents usurping President Yanukovych. The UN 
general assembly resolution 68/262 adopted on 27 
March 2014 on the ‘territorial integrity of Ukraine’ 
affirmed the General Assembly’s commitment to its 
internationally recognised borders. One hundred voted 
in favour and only 11 voted against (Armenia, Belarus, 
Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, Sudan, 
Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe).  
This voting is widely interpreted as an overwhelming 
victory for the West against an isolated and aggressive 
Russia. What is not considered are the 58 countries 
which abstained and the 24 which absented themselves. 
The abstentions accounted for 58 per cent of the world 
population, 34 per cent of those voting and 30 per 
cent of the membership of the UN.  They included 
China, most of the CIS states, the BRICS and many 
Latin American and African states.12  The significance 
of their abstention and non-voting is a clear indication 
of sympathy with Russia in its dealings with the West.
GoInG ForWArD
The future relationship between the EU and the EEU 
is clouded by the contradictory values and interests 
within both geo-political blocs.  As in the EU, the elites in 
member states of the EEU have different priorities. The 
EEU is a movement which is reactive – it is opposed to 
Western hegemony and seeks an equal and respected, 
rather than a dominant, place in the world community. 
It lacks any grounding in a political theory (comparable 
to Marxist class interest) to legitimate its superiority 
and, outside the area of Eurasia, it is not expansionary 
in vision. The ideology of Eurasianism is conservative 
and legitimates a capitalist framework. What kind of 
capitalism is yet to be established?
Eurasianism, as advocated by President Putin and his 
associates, is highly ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
EEU is considered to be an institution modelled on the 
EU with its concern for the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labour. On the other hand, many 
of its advocates consider it to be a shift away from 
the hegemony of competitive markets to a state-led 
economy exerting significant degrees of control. 
In its least radical form it would be a ‘stepping stone’ 
towards the existing neo-liberal global system, another 
regional neo-liberal bloc. While China as well as the 
Eurasian states are less exposed to global capitalist 
concerns and have a potential for internally state-led 
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economic development, there are also neo-liberal 
interests derived from companies seeking profits from 
Western markets as well as politicians and intellectuals 
driven by liberal ideology. Russian writers, such as E. 
Vinokurov and T. Tsukarev, envisage the EEU’s long 
term economic cooperation to lie with the EU and 
China13 – they see Russia standing on the ‘two legs’ of 
the EU and China.  
The EEU alone cannot mount a very serious economic 
challenge to the European part of the hegemonic 
core. Enlargement to include other former countries 
of the Soviet Union is limited politically and (excluding 
Ukraine) would not significantly enhance its power. Its 
share of global gross domestic product (GDP) is only 3.2 
per cent; it has very few global companies to compete 
with those in the economic core. A political realist would 
hope to join the latter rather than compete with it. An 
acceptance of neo-liberal market relationships would 
move the project towards inclusion in the present 
global system constituting a complimentary regional 
bloc to the EU. 
But there is by no means a consensus, either within 
or between the countries forming the EEU, on the 
desirability of such a regional development. The tensions 
between the Russian leadership (particularly under 
President Putin) and leading Western trading nations 
are underpinned by significant differences of interest 
between Russia and the West. To preserve a stable 
international order, the hegemonic Western powers will 
need to be more pluralistic and accommodating to the 
positions of others by adopting a more realist and less 
liberal internationalist political position. The EU political 
and economic elites who benefit most have to share 
their power with those who benefit least. Politically, 
the West has pursued a policy of promoting electoral 
democracy within states, rather than encouraging 
democracy between states. The EEU’s option to join 
the world system as a component part based on neo-
liberal economic principles has been effectively closed 
off by Western policies. 
Thus many among Eurasian political and economic 
elites look to an alternative, to a state-led economy set 
to become a political and economic counterpoint to the 
West. Such views are strengthened by the damaging 
political and social consequences of the enlargement 
of the EU, the debacle of the Eurozone and the crisis 
in Greece currently making the EU less of a body to be 
emulated by outsiders. Moreover, the history of post-
Soviet economic development modelled on markets 
has led many to question the underlying principles 
of a market-led approach. They point out that the 
post-socialist states are at the lower end of economic 
value-added chains benefiting the West; research 
and development and the manufacturing base have 
declined. Such critics contend that future participation 
in markets to the east may present greater opportunities 
for economic progress. All these arguments fuel the 
more radical Eurasianist perspective.
The EEU is more likely to evolve as a ‘counterpoint’, 
relying on greater state coordination and regulation 
economically and a top-down political system. Returning 
to Vinokurov and Tsukarev’s analogy, the Chinese leg 
might well provide one firm base but the EEU will have 
to learn to stand more firmly on its own other leg. 
To build any significant alternative to the neo-liberal 
global order, the EEU will find it necessary to combine 
with semi-core countries, particularly the SCO and the 
BRICS. Such an economic alternative might prioritise 
economic development through administrative forms 
of collective economic coordination. It could provide 
the basis for a more pluralist and multi-polar world. 
E.H. Carr’s rather pessimistic conclusion cited at the 
beginning of this chapter might be replaced not by 
another utopia but an alternative bloc resting on an 
organised form of national capitalism. As following the 
twenty-year crisis, the danger here is that political and 
economic competition, if unrestrained, may lead to war.
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. The West should recognise that the EEU is 
not aggressive but reactive and has sought 
accommodation with the neo-liberal order.
2. The West should refrain from seeking hegemony 
over post-Soviet space and should move towards 
multi-polarity.
3. To secure the EU’s aims of peace and security 
requires less democracy promotion within states 
and more democracy between states. ■
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